Sociology has less to say about propaganda than it should and much less than it used to. Why is this? Can anything be done about it? Answering the first question is tricky but I will review some of the evidence. Amongst this is the fact that sociological attention has been diverted from propaganda in part by a successful (propaganda?) campaign to create alternatives to the term propaganda.
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Sociology has less to say about propaganda than it should and much less than it used to. Why is this? Can anything be done about it? Answering the first question is tricky but I will review some of the evidence. Amongst this is the fact that sociological attention has been diverted from propaganda in part by a successful (propaganda?) campaign to create alternatives to the term propaganda.
On the second question, only time will tell. I want, however, to make an argument by example. I want to try and suggest that propaganda -or whatever we decide to call it -can and should be an important topic for sociologists to examine.
There is no need to leave it to the historians, the political scientists or to media studies, and certainly not to the subject specialists of 'public relations'! My approach to propaganda and psychological operations (psyops) springs directly from my appreciation of the wider problems of media power that were inculcated in me after I found the Media Group in the summer of 1985.
I fell eagerly on the material in War and Peace News (Broadbent et al. 1985) , which described the way in which TV news reproduced and amplified government misinformation -on the bombing of Port Stanley, for example, and the way in which protest movements like the women at Greenham Common were traduced by 'objectivity' and 'balance'. My first opportunity to contribute to the work of the Media Group was in the analysis of state and private attacks on broadcasters via
Norman Tebbit and the Media Monitoring Unit, which had a weak empirical, yet strong ideological, grasp on how the media actually performed in the context of such controversies as the 1985 US attack on Libya.
John Eldridge was always clear that there was more to media studies than simply analysing news 'discourse', a word I am not sure I ever heard him use. So it came to pass that my own PhD research started with the media coverage of the SAS killings of three unarmed IRA volunteers in Gibraltar in March 1988 (Miller 1994) . It was obvious in that case that the deluge of misinformation and falsehoods relayed by the press and TV were not just the product of pressures from within the media system.
There was also pressure from without in the form of, firstly, intimidation, bullying and the strategic use of the law by the state and, secondly, (mis)information supplied by governmental institutions of organized persuasive communication. No-one at Glasgow warned me not to investigate government misdeeds directly. No-one said watch out, keep your investigations focused on media institutions, do not look at the government, the military, the police or the intelligence agencies. I didn't know that the encouragement I got in Glasgow was then, and remains now, a rare and very valuable commodity. Since then I have experienced discouragement and attempted discouragement on numerous occasions from colleagues, university bureaucracies and indeed from those who make their living managing public debate and decisionmaking in what Raymond Williams (1985:268) called the institutions of 'disinformation and distraction'.
The approach that is needed to understand the information strategies of government (and indeed of any organised actor) should not be mediacentric (Miller 1993; Schlesinger 1989) -that is, such an approach must see communications from the points of view of all those involved in the process not just the media (as much media studies continues to do) or indeed from the point of view only of the creators and authors of communicative strategies in government as seen via public records. It must be seen in terms of the wider set of intersections between different actors and audiences which comprise the 'circuit of mass communications' (Philo et al. 2015) , itself a key part of the social totality. In other words, 'means of communication are themselves means of production' (Williams 1980:50) . It is salutary to remember that no act of communication, from the utterance of an individual or its amplification via a megaphone, to leaflets, newspapers, books, films and indeed the internet and social media, leaps magically into existence from the force of our imaginations, but all such acts have social and material conditions of existence. As it is with communications media, so it is with 'propaganda'; with publicity, persuasion, advertising and (Vatican 2015) . The sense of propagating certain states of affairs makes the term propaganda superior to many of the alternative terms that were proffered after the term fell into disrepute in the twentieth century.
Propaganda and the symbolic
When we look back at the history of writing on propaganda from the 1920s on, what we find are mostly discussions only of the 'symbolic' dimensions of propaganda.
According to Harold Lasswell in his classic 1927 study, 'Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols.'
Similarly Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton (1943:58) stated 'We understand by propaganda any and all sets of symbols which influence opinion, belief or action on issues regarded by the community as controversial. These symbols may be written, printed, spoken, pictorial or musical.' This definition has been long lasting -forming also the basis of Qualter's (1985:124) classic study some half a century later; the 'deliberate attempt by the few to influence the attitudes and behaviour of the many by the manipulation of symbolic communication.'
On the other hand, the classic accounts are worth re-reading, as John Eldridge (2007) shows in his short review of the work of Merton and Lazarsfeld. This is because they remind us both that several aspects of received wisdom on 'propaganda' are incorrect and because they help us to trace the process by which 'propaganda' was airbrushed from sociology (and social science) and from discussion in polite company more generally.
For example, the fact that 'propaganda' can be true was noted by Lazarsfeld and Merton. 'An authentic account of the sinking of American merchant ships in the time of war … may prove to be effective propaganda inducing citizens to accept deprivations which they would not otherwise accept in good spirits' (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1943:58) . Propaganda, in other words, is not only about lies or about the deceptive use of communications. It is important to remember this given later attempts, which we will review below, to pretend that 'our' activities are truthful and thus not like 'their' propaganda or 'psyops'.
The dispute over propaganda
The dispute over the term propaganda emerged strongly in the US after the First World War and was not as simple as it is often remembered. It is true that there was a dispute about how appropriate the term was, but also about how desirable the practice of propaganda was. There were thus four positions: in the first, the term was good but the activity, deceptive and manipulative, was to be deprecated (for example , Lee 1951; Lynd 1939) . The second agreed the term was good and while the activity could be bad, it was not irredeemably so. Position two is today associated strongly with the work of many of those writers who undertake studies of 'propaganda'. British historian Philip Taylor (1999:260 ) is a prominent example. He concluded his historical overview of British propaganda with the cri de coeur: 'democracies may delude themselves' into thinking their activities 'not propaganda' but 'information'.
However, he noted, 'their propaganda is in the right tradition … Democracies should not be ashamed of selling democracy.' The third position was that the term was bad, as it delegitimised the activity that was, if not noble, at least unavoidable (as for Lasswell, Lazarsfeld and Merton) . The fourth position was that the term was bad and the activity it described was not acceptable in a democracy. Sometimes this position was principled, but it could equally be used to suggest that by definition or in practice democracies did not engage in propaganda. This latter is most closely associated with apologists for the public relations industry today (Dinan and Miller 2007) .
The debate was a serious matter. In their 1935 annotated bibliography, Harold
Lasswell and his colleagues (1969 [1935] ) listed more than 3000 published items on propaganda and promotional activities. Timothy Glander (2000:2) Propaganda was understood by its chief chronicler, Harold D Lasswell, as a 'concession' to the 'wilfulness of the age'. 'The bonds of personal loyalty and affection which bound a man to his chief', wrote Lasswell (1927:198-9) , 'have long since dissolved. Monarchy and class privilege have gone the way of all flesh, and the idolatry of the individual passes for the official religion of democracy.' In such a situation, the 'new antidote to willfulness is propaganda. If the mass will be free of chains of iron, it must accept its chains of silver. If it will not love, honor and obey, it must not expect to escape seduction' (Lasswell 1927: 199) .
Although Lasswell sometimes appeared ambivalent about the term propaganda, he was a firm proponent of its continuation as a practice. According to Glander (2000:xi) :
Those individuals interested in utilizing propaganda in the conduct of the war orchestrated a semantic shift away from the term propaganda … By the onset of World War II, then, mass communications research was the new term to describe what were previously regarded as attempts to develop effective propaganda techniques So one of the key reasons that sociologists stopped talking about propaganda was that those who were critical of lies and manipulation lost out to those who favoured them.
The latter decided not to call these processes propaganda at all, thus making it harder to focus discussion on the question of elite social power and communications. McClung Lee had been associated with the Institute for Propaganda Analysis and -so argue his biographers -this was related to the marginalisation he and Elizabeth Briant Lee (to whom he was married -she was also a sociologist) experienced in American sociological circles in the post-war period (Galliher and Galliher 1995) .
From that point on Western liberal democracies, in particular the US and UK, invested much more in propaganda than they had before. This was the case not least Hadley Cantril (Simpson 1994: 81) .
As Glander puts it:
The construction of propaganda organizations during the war provided an important training ground for mass communications researchers; and through these organizations, mass communications researchers made important personal contacts that facilitated the establishment of the field in the postwar period. (Glander 2000:40) Simpson ( 
The case of the British military and 'Psyops'
So, although the term propaganda fell out of favour amongst sociologists, the practice only got more central in political life. But in sociology, though the practice was often endorsed, much scholarly effort was expended on finding more palatable alternatives.
The problem was that replacement terms also began to accumulate the taint of the old.
Thus the replacement term 'public relations' has itself accumulated negative connotations (Dinan and Miller 2009 (Cobain 2012:125) .
The MoD confirmed to the paper that military personnel undergoing what was called 'resistance to interrogation' training were locked in stocks for long periods, forced to sit for long periods on a small one legged stool, and locked in narrow boxes and doused in water. It was not true, the MoD insisted, that they were also stripped naked and forced to stand for long periods while chained to nearby objects. (Cobain 2012:125) This was a classic 'non-denial denial'. The MoD went on to admit that some personnel were actually stripped naked: 'Men are made to stand and sometimes chained … but usually with underclothes on.' Questions were asked in the House, and the Prime Minister replied that 'the techniques to which these questions refer have never been used by any organisations responsible to Her Majesty's Government'.
This was false. The British had been using torture in Cairo and in Cyprus as well as in In other words, the official line was that psyops had been ended with the creation of the Information Policy Unit. This was a difficult position to accept given that INQ 1873 had indicated that the plans for a psyops committee may have 'devolved' from the discussion they had. Furthermore, it was not at all clear from the evidence given that they really were denying that dishonest or misleading information was circulated.
Their denials, were, in the manner observed above in the 1960 case, non-denial denials. Tugwell himself struggled to state clearly that deception and dishonesty were ruled out. Firstly, he drew a distinction between the two terms: 'it is not dishonest to carry … out small deception operations. There is nothing dishonest about that.' In cross-examination he was confronted with his own words from 1972: '"black" activities are unlikely to benefit us except in rare, carefully controlled instances' (Tugwell 1972 Contrary to the impression given by official witnesses at the Saville Inquiry, that psyops was a marginal activity which had been phased out, the document says explicitly that 'Strategic psyops' are 'a continuing activity with a high political content'. Formulation of policy and overall strategy in this area was said to involve 'several departments' through a committee (The Defence and Overseas Policy The document goes on to note that since the Second World War British forces have employed psyops on a number of occasions. In Malaya, they 'were used to isolate the terrorists from the civil population, create apathy, discord and defeatism within the terrorists' organisation, and eventually to conduct an effective surrender campaign'. In Borneo, psyops were 'used successfully'. In Oman, psyops 'have played a valuable part in encouraging the surrender of over 500 rebels, most of whom are now fighting as members of the Government Firquats' (Stanbridge 1973) . The
Firquats were a paramilitary force trained by the Special Air Service (SAS).
Government policy 'required at the time that "the Services … annotate certain posts to be psyops trained (five day course) by JWE [Joint Warfare Establishment]""
In addition other posts were 'annotated' to be 'psyops briefed' (A-4). These posts were listed over six pages in an appendix to the document.
In short, the document gives a markedly different account of the role of The document also refers to psyops as 'improving relationships with allies, undermining the enemy's will to fight, promoting suspicion and distrust and exploiting disagreements among the enemy' to 'lower morale, promote defeatism, discord, and perhaps panic, and to encourage desertion, defection and surrender' (A-2). 'Deception' is thus referred to as a 'specialised form of psyops' (A-3) and is distinguished from 'public relations', which is 'concerned solely with the dissemination of factual information' (A-2). Much of the document, therefore, undermines the official testimony at the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.
Psyops today
Today psyops continues to be practised by the UK state, including by a secretive 'I absolutely hate that word,' he sighs. 'The term propaganda is applied to untruthful past dictatorial regimes, which used media for their own devious ends. That's not the genesis of psyops. I know a lot of people on the web link propaganda and psyops together, but everything we do is perfectly truthful and perfectly attributable. That's cast in gold. A lie will always catch you out.'
As the BBC reported, 'they say that what they produce must be both attributable and truthful, in stark contrast to the traditional reputation of psyops in the US and on the internet, where conspiracy theories abound' (Wyatt 2012 ).
The trouble with such reassuring sentiments is that they appear to bear only an ambiguous relation to the truth. Let's take each in turn: the link between psyops and propaganda; 'attribution' and lying; and secrecy and openness.
Propaganda and psyops
Psyops is linked umbilically to propaganda. The accepted account of the genesis of the term is that it entered the English language from the German Nazi phrase Weltanschauungskrieg ('world view warfare') (Simpson 1994:11) . 
US military and intelligence organisations 'stretched the definition during
World War II to cover a broader range of applications of psychology and social psychology to wartime problems, including battlefront propaganda, ideological training of friendly forces, and ensuring morale and discipline on the home front' (Simpson 1994:11) .
Propaganda by Western democratic regimes is very much the origins of psychological warfare. Psychological operations is simply a term used in peacetime as a more palatable alternative to 'warfare'.
Attribution and truth
Claims of truthfulness and attribution can be examined in a number of ways. One is to examine the revised doctrine on 'Information operations' published by the Ministry of Defence published in 2009. It does not seem to substantiate the claim of honesty and accuracy.
Information operations will on occasion require an aggressive and manipulative approach to delivering messages (usually through the PSYOPS tool). This is essential in order to attack, undermine and defeat the will, understanding and capability of insurgents (Ministry of Defence 2009:6-5)
Perhaps one can aggressively and manipulatively deliver honest and open messages?
The question of attribution goes to the heart of whether psyops engages in 'black'
operations. These are operations often thought of as 'dirty tricks', but can be more narrowly defined as activities where the source of the message is disguised or faked, perhaps through forged documents or through radio or TV broadcasts which claim to be from one's opponent. We saw examples above of discussion of this in Northern
Ireland in the early 1970s. Colonel Bob Stewart, who commanded the British peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, reportedly 'made use of psyops techniques when he served as an intelligence officer in Northern Ireland during the Troubles' (Kelly 2008) . He distinguishes between white and black propaganda: 'White is when you tell things as they are, while black is putting more devious stuff about.' 'The value of psyops can be immense,' he says, 'but whatever you say must be believable, and preferably the truth.' Note: 'preferably' the truth.
Secrecy and openness
Psyops and other official propaganda activities are also chronically secretive and lacking in openness. The possibility that an occupying power might be able to promote 'free and unbiased' discussion seems, perhaps, a little unlikely in itself. We can note that in the 
Psyops and coercion
It is not as if as Tatham We use tactical and strategic methods. Tactically, on the first stage, we target the military by dropping leaflets stating the inevitability of their defeat, telling them they will not be destroyed if they play our game and exactly how they can surrender. On the second wave we show them pictures of Iraqi officers who complied. On the third wave we show them pictures of those people who did not.
Translation: co-operate or we will kill you. This approach can be seen in many of the psyops leaflets produced during the Iraq War, which emphasise that, for example, Another indication of how 'kinetic effects' or 'hard power' interact with psyops can be seen in the Abu Ghraib torture photos scandal. Some thought that the images of the degradation of Iraqi prisoners showed torture and were 'trophy photos' (Zimbardo 2005) . They may have been. But there is evidence not only that the 'enhanced interrogation techniques' were authorised by the Bush administration up to and including the Vice-President and President (BBC News 2014), but also that the images were part of the torture as opposed to merely a record of it.
Seymour Hersh (2004) revealed that this operation ran by the name of Copper
Green. According to one of his sources, the purpose of the photographs was to create an army of informants, people you could insert back in the population … It was thought that some prisoners would do anything -including spying on their associates -to avoid dissemination of the shameful photos to family and friends.
According to Lynndie England, the poster girl for the Abu Ghraib scandal:
I was instructed by persons in higher rank to 'stand there, hold this leash and look at the camera. The Abu Ghraib photos are not, therefore, just a record of torture, but an active part in the process of torture -an illustration of the coercive nature of this kind of psyops and of its continuing and close relationship with intelligence and torture.
Sociology and propaganda
Some conclusions: it is important to go back to examine the work of early sociologists as they have much to teach, not least on the importance of propaganda. Of course it might be that we don't learn the same lessons as they did, but at least we will understand more about how we got where we are now.
Propaganda is not simply a matter of the symbolic, but of concrete action The question of what we call propaganda is not going away. While the attempt to replace the term with less honest terms such as public relations has had some notable success, particularly in terms of scholarly production, propaganda has not been excised from common usage. The difficulty is that successive replacements for propaganda end up being tainted by association with manipulation and deception.
This will continue to happen, as we saw in the example of psychological warfare and its replacement with psyops.
The attempts by state operatives to airbrush their communication strategies, by calling them something sweeter smelling, absorbs significant human and ideological resources. Question their work and you may find that government officials write to your employer to complain, suggest that material about them is 'removed' from the web, denounce 'conspiracy theorists' and 'pseudo-academics' who write 'utter guff' which 'deliberately misrepresent[s]' psyops.
Propaganda and psychological operations have historically been secret and are still not fully and openly acknowledged by the British state or its operatives and disciples. Secrecy is one reason why we have not properly appreciated how propaganda works. But, as we have seen, the willing subordination of sociologists to the interests and values of great power is another.
